Why Great Powers Sleepwalk to War — A Masterclass with Prof. Hugh White

Analysis of Donald Kagan's 'The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War' and whether war between Athens and Sparta was inevitable. White argues that while grand shifts in power distribution create conditions for war, leaders always have choices—a critical lesson for understanding US-China rivalry today. The discussion unpacks how small disputes (Epidamnos, Megarian decree) escalated into catastrophic war despite neither side truly threatening the other's core interests.

• •Kagan challenges Thucydides' claim that war was 'inevitable'—at every point, leaders had choices to avoid conflict
• •The Thucydides Trap (rising power vs established power) directly parallels US-China competition; Xi Jinping explicitly referenced it
• •War started from internal dispute in obscure town (Epidamnos), dragging in Corcyra, Corinth, then Athens and Sparta—similar to how Taiwan or Serbia could trigger great power war
• •Athens wasn't actually threatening Sparta's position; failures of imagination and poor decision-making (Pericles' Megarian decree) drove escalation
• •Preserving consciousness of choice is essential—saying 'we have no choice' relieves leaders of responsibility for war decisions

Discussion of Garrett Mattingly's narrative history examining Philip II's decision to launch the Armada against England in 1588. White emphasizes how multiple strands—religious conflict, French civil war, technological factors—converged, and how even sophisticated leaders like Philip made 'harebrained' strategic decisions. The book illustrates how military realities (English naval superiority, difficulty of amphibious operations) interact with grand strategy.

• •Philip II's decision was militarily unsound—required coordinating fleet from Spain with army crossing English Channel, a massive logistical challenge
• •Religious motivations (Counter-Reformation) were genuine, not just pretext, but aligned with Spain's strategic interests in controlling England
• •Technological advantage mattered decisively—English guns had superior range, preventing Spanish grappling tactics from working
• •The Armada story is subset of larger Spain-France contest; understanding interconnections between multiple theaters is critical
• •Even highly capable, prudent leaders (Philip was meticulous bureaucrat) can make catastrophically wrong decisions under pressure

Analysis of AJP Taylor's 'The Struggle for Mastery in Europe,' a diplomatic history showing how Europe's multipolar order adapted to massive shifts in wealth and power distribution over 70 years. White uses this as textbook for understanding how complex international systems manage change—and ultimately fail. Taylor's provocative prose and sweeping generalizations make strategic history accessible while maintaining scholarly rigor.

• •Europe successfully managed dramatic power shifts (German unification, Russian industrialization, colonial expansion) from 1848-1914 before catastrophic failure
• •The book is textbook for how multipolar orders work—multiple great powers, complex alliance systems, constant diplomatic maneuvering
• •Taylor's chapter 18 on Anglo-French rapprochement shows how former rivals can align when facing new threats (Germany)
• •Events outside Europe (Far East, China, Japan) increasingly shaped European power politics—foreshadowing Pacific War
• •Taylor's accessible prose with 'outrageous statements' makes complex diplomatic history engaging; sometimes worth reading at random for insight

Deep dive into Taylor's chapter 22 on WWI outbreak, examining whether Germany planned the war or stumbled into it. White argues that fractured decision-making in monarchies (Kaiser, Tsar, Franz Josef), combined with everyone expecting allies to back down, created conditions where war nobody wanted became reality. Critical parallels drawn to US-China dynamics over Taiwan, where both sides hope to achieve objectives through deterrence rather than actual conflict.

• •Austria wanted war with Serbia, not the general war they got; gambled Russia would be deterred by Germany
• •Germany didn't plan to start war but went along willingly when opportunity arose, driven by fear of rising Russian power
• •Every power expected others to abandon their allies—Austria thought Russia would back down, Russia thought Germany would abandon Austria, etc.
• •Once preliminary mobilization decisions made, military timetables (railway schedules, Schlieffen Plan) removed flexibility—commanders couldn't change plans without chaos
• •All five great powers saw 1914 as test of their status; hoped to preserve position by making others back down without actual war—exactly like US-China over Taiwan today

Detailed explanation of Germany's war plan and how technological factors (railways, telegraph, mass armies) created rigid mobilization schedules that eliminated strategic flexibility. White argues military commanders weren't 'boneheaded'—they were prisoners of technology that required incredibly elaborate forward planning. This has direct parallels to modern nuclear weapons and ICBMs where speed eliminates decision time.

• •Schlieffen Plan required defeating France in 6 weeks via Belgium, then pivoting to Russia—assumed Franco-Russian alliance would hold
• •Germany had to violate Belgian neutrality, which guaranteed British entry, but discounted Britain's small army (6 divisions vs 160+ German/French divisions)
• •19th century technology (railways, telegraph, industrialization) enabled massive armies but required precise, inflexible mobilization—trains crossing bridges every 7 minutes for weeks
• •Once mobilization started, couldn't be changed—Kaiser couldn't fight Russia without France, Tsar couldn't mobilize against Austria without Germany, due to technical constraints
• •Modern parallel: ICBMs create same loss of flexibility and decision time that railway timetables created in 1914

Discussion of Barbara Tuchman's military history of WWI's first month, focusing on how the Schlieffen Plan nearly worked but ultimately failed. White emphasizes the book's influence (Kennedy read it during Cuban Missile Crisis) and its masterful interweaving of plans, technology, personalities, and physical exhaustion. The book shows how individual commanders and battlefield realities matter as much as grand strategy.

• •Published 1962, had huge impact on Cold War thinking; Kennedy reading it during Cuban Missile Crisis shaped his crisis management approach
• •Primarily military history of first month's battles, not just outbreak—shows how initial operations shaped entire war's trajectory
• •German army nearly succeeded but 'ran out of puff'—physical exhaustion, logistics, and momentum matter in actual warfare
• •Individual commanders' capacities (Foch, French, Ludendorff) significantly impacted outcomes—'great man' view of history has validity in wartime
• •Battle of the Marne created Western Front stalemate that defined WWI; neither side achieved decisive victory despite massive initial movements